On efficiently implementing corporatism
The main
idea: a corporatist system where only corporations of a certain minimal market
cap would be allowed to operate any economic activity at all would be a great
improvement over straight socialism.
0. Posts on this blog are ranked in decreasing order of likeability to myself. This entry was originally posted on 26.09.2022, and the current version may have been updated several times from its original form.
1 The system
1.1 The efficient implementation of a truly corporatist
economic system requires publicly-listed firms acting as clearinghouses of
their own shares, as discussed previously.
1.2 Now that one’s market cap is an actionable datum, you
can put all the weight of the world on it. Only firms of at least X value are
allowed to operate and serve the market. The X would be such as to allow the
operation of no more than a couple dozen firms in the whole country. The end.
1.3 X would be enforced by establishing the appropriate lower
limit to the price the firm is allowed to post for their shares. You cannot pay
any less and - if your shares are perceived as being worth less - you suffer a
run and are liquidated.
1.4 I have no good way to allow new firms to grow into the
limit, but a decent attempt would be to foresee a lower Y limit where you would
be allowed to operate, as long as you sustain a relatively high growth rate
such as to lead to the X limit within no more than a few years.
1.5 Surely, delivering all economic activity into the hands
of a handful of megacorps would create monstrous, vertically-integrated behemoths
that make everything from tomatoes to cars. These would be highly bureaucratic organisations,
highly susceptible to capture from entropic forces, although at least still
subject to a bit of market discipline from both competitors (such as they are)
and shareholders.
1.6 In practice, I don’t think any particular market would be serviced by more than one firm, as even a middle-sized country would have so many goods and services to provide that competing head on would be silly. Competition would be of the monopolistic form, with sets of not so close substitute products vying for the same consumer dollar. If we go by the rule of thumb of three firms being able to coordinate, each market would see firms colluding to set prices and limit quantities to a great degree.
1.7 Last, but not least, you could do worse than having your political system run by the council of Chief Executives of these firms. Indeed, given the very dynamic shareholding situation created by the each-firm-its-own-clearinghouse model as per 1.1 and the issue of corporate government by AGM being obsolete as per the linked post there, it is unlikely that shareholders would have anything to do with the selection of these Chief Executives at all.
2 The original rationale
2.1 I originally designed this very simple system based on a
certain, very libertarian understanding of regulation. By that understanding,
regulation is but a tool used by incumbents to keep competitors down and ensure
higher than normal profit rates for themselves.
2.2 By that model, the need to limit competition wreaks
havoc across the whole economy, hobbling firms large and small alike. Sure, your
tiny start-up competitor is smothered, but you yourself are operating at far
from full efficiency. Even though for you this is a rational price to pay for
limiting potential competition, for society as a whole this is a double loss.
2.3 So, if you can make sure that the big fish are protected
from competition whilst being able to themselves operate at full efficiency,
you’d get a Pareto-improvement on the default setting of ever-increasing regulation,
with cascading failures that eventually lead to full socialism.
2.4 Now, I no longer subscribe fully to that model of regulation.
Yes, it is obvious that big firms and entrenched interests use the revolving door
to hit potential competitors in their infancy, but this does not mean that
regulation (such as it is) serves no purpose.
2.5 In the absence of regulation, one can postulate justice
to be carried out by way of citizen juries. What makes one think that such
juries of Johns and Bobs would be able to decide on highly complex, technical
issues related to electromagnetic spectrum separation, risk of cancer that is
acceptable from lack of catalytic converters, etc.
2.6 Such juries I now expect to rule very conservatively in
issues where a technology’s benefits are to be weighted against a probabilistic
health risk. I’d expect nearly all rulings to go in favour of holding diesel engines
to be carcinogenic. The EPA has regulated diesels nearly out of existence, but at
least we got them for a century.
2.7 So, the self interest of a bunch of big fish coalesces
around state capture and regulation as a pre-emptive tool, which grants them
immunity for legal action as long as operations conform to these rules. No firm
was even fined for damages when operating within the regulatory envelope.
2.8 Now, I don’t know of the right cut-off between health
risk and technological benefits, and have no idea of which system could provide
a society-wide choice near the optimum. I think the unbridled jury would err
too much on the side of caution, but don’t know how far away from the optimum
regulation lands us. So, I can no longer claim honestly that regulation serves
no good at all, despite it being an obvious tool designed to smother competition.
2.9 Nevertheless, by optimising another tool such as to limit
competition, regulation would be left freer to deal with matters of the right amount
of tech. I have no doubt that regulation as informally decided by a couple
dozen megacorps would skew far in the direction of permissiveness (assuming it would
even exist), which I suspect would be overshooting the optimum, but I have no model
I can use to confirm this intuition.
3 The current rationale
3.1 In my model exploring the implications of the High and
Low vs. Middle model of political conflict, I predicted that the HL coalition
gravitates towards full socialism as its ultimate desideratum.
3.2 Efficient corporatism should be a very acceptable substitute,
as it fulfils the same criteria as full socialism when viewed from the lenses
of the High. For the rest of us, it should be rather clear how infinitely
preferable such a system would be to socialist misery.
3.21 Now look, I’d be lying if I didn’t admit that I also rely on this system to temper some of the least palatable facets of modern consumerist societies, as caused by the characteristics of market demand. Key among these are the tendency for deafening and intrusive marketing campaigns that devolve into virtue signaling, the presence of an inordinate amount of minute variations of the same basic product, or the devotion of huge intellectual energies into minutely improving products that cause almost no gain in utility.
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